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BOOK REVIEWS
By Curtis Bok.1 Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1955. Pp. 79. $2.00. This slim volume
presents as conscientious a search for justice as the two earlier
works of the author. Backbone of the Herring and I Too, Nicodemus, fictional accounts of a judge's quest for justice, were
deservedly popular because of their felicity of style, depth of
thought and warm humanity. The qualities that distinguished
those works are present in these three Roscoe Pound lectures
delivered last year at the University of Nebraska.
The three essay-lectures are entitled "The Trial," "The Substantive Law" and "Penology and Treatment." Judge Bok, president judge of a Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia, has deliberately adopted a method that is exploratory rather than dogmatic. At the risk of quoting him out of context, it may be said
that he has the modest aim of making certain "that something
more than laissez faire is guiding us" in the fields of criminal
law and procedure, which are frequently disdained by our betterknown jurisprudents and legal reformers. His avowed intent is
to state the problems and to set out the best arguments of the
various antagonists in these areas "in the hope that some answers may emerge by themselves."'2 His approach is calm and
reasoned; he strikes a delicate balance; he puts each argument
quietly, gracefully, as the best advocate of that contention.
In "The Trial," Judge Bok sees as the most pressing questions
of the day the future of the jury system, the adversary nature
of the criminal trial, the choice of a test of criminal responsibility,
and lastly, the problem of the psychiatrist in the courtroom. It
is in his discussion of the last-mentioned topic that his unique
gift for understanding and fairly setting forth opposing positions
is most evident. He feels the frustration that the psychiatrist experiences when forced to testify within the confines of the
M'Naghten Rule, its test of criminal responsibility grotesque and
meaningless in the light of present psychological thought. On the
other hand, he can sympathize with the lawyer who
PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL LAW.

is unhappy over Courtroom psychiatry because of the growing
feeling that we are all at least a little mad. He fears that abandoning
the simple legal test of responsibility will lead to a shifting quicksand of standards that differ from case to case; he is fearful that
...

1 President Judge, Court of Common Pleas, No. 6, Philadelphia County.
Author of BACKBONE OF THE HERRING (1941), and I Too, NICODE-US (1946).

2 Text at 6.
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the machinery of the Courts must be unreasonably expanded to
meet psychiatry's need to observe, diagnose, and testify to the condition of each defendant or bog down altogether; and he views with
positive alarm the destruction of all conventional penology in favor
of a vague system of indeterminate treatment. And the whole business promises to be expensive. 3

Moreover, the lawyer recognizes that psychological theory is
today only in its infancy, its methods still experimental. He fears
situations such as that which occurred in a jurisdiction following the psychiatrically-oriented Durham4 test, where a defendant was acquitted of a criminal charge on the ground of insanity
and thereafter successfully avoided commitment to a mental
hospital.
The solution to this heart-breaking failure of communication
between the lawyer and the psychiatrist, Judge Bok does not completely see. Thus he is in the same position as other serious thinkers seeking to effect a closer union of the two disciplines. He does,
however, feel that the great merit lying in the psychiatrist's
search for the motivating factors of criminal conduct justifies
a hope that progress in communication and cooperation may be
made, at least to the extent of some shared training, exchange of
essential medical data outside of constitutional protection, joint
examination of an accused by psychiatrists testifying for the
prosecution and defense, and by the establishment of better facilities for- the psychological study of an accused whose mental
condition is in issue.
"The Substantive Law" points up the difficulties resulting
from what Judge Bok calls the "splendid jumble" of ad hoc penal
legislation dating back to the last century.
As a judge with the dark task of sentencing convicted persons, I can
bear direct witness to the need for massive and fundamental
thought, in the light of modem conditions, about the codex criminalis,from basic conception to final text. 5

He goes on to consider the specific problem presented of justifying governmental regulations where criminal intent is deemed
irrelevant to guilt. "To condemn without fault is a sinister idea
for free people to tolerate. Yet we are tolerating it more and
more.... -6
Next follows a discussion of general problems that cut across
Id. at 19.
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
5 Text at 28.
6 Id. at 29.
*

4
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the operation of the entire criminal code: the death penalty, federal review of due process, the construction of penal statutes,
disparity of sentencing and the purpose and methods of penology.
Judge Bok also considers proposals for a model penal code providing for, among other things, psychiatric examination and classification of criminals, elastic minimum sentences, and criteria
for the sentencing judge.
Deeming it "better to suggest specifics as a basis of thought
and discussion than to speak generally about trends in legal
thinking that might lead to unspecified changes,"17 the author
then examines the clash between due process and efficient police
practices, the proper limits of corporate criminal responsibility,
the abolition of distinctions among offenses against property and
among crimes of violence, and the question of the wisdom of invoking criminal sanctions against certain sexual offenders.
A brief summary of the history of penal institutions and practices introduces the lecture entitled "Penology and Treatment."
The author continues with an examination of trends in the treatment of criminals today, three general attitudes about the proper
handling of convicts, the spotty success of juvenile and youthful
offender authorities, and recent advances in adult penology.
The principal problems facing penologists today are declared
to be the need for research, the fortress character of many of
our penal structures, the necessity to provide for the emotional
needs of prisoners, the question of sale of products of prison
labor, and the personnel problems of correctional institutions.
There is included a concise, clear description of the program
at Chino, the California minimum security prison, and an acknowledgment of the expense of maintaining such establishments.
[I]t may be that the cheaper form of new institution with its added
facilities and higher quality of personnel will in sum be as expensive
as the creation of the old-fashioned institution, which in itself is
enormously expensive. But it makes little sense to go on spending
sixty cents of the same dollar over and over again, as we are now
doing with our sixty per cent recidivist rate.8

Judge Bok concludes with a statement of general principles,
originally formulated by the American Prison Association in
1870, that he thinks should govern future developments in
penology.
This is a fascinating little book, well worth the time of the
busy practitioner who wants to be brought up to date on current
thinking in the field of criminal law. It is compounded of realistic
7

8

Id. at 54.
Id. at 76.
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thought and pungent, non-technical expression. It does not fear
to challenge the very foundations of the criminal law and is itself
an excellent example of the fruits of the "fundamental thought"
advocated by the author. Nevertheless, he evidences no desire
to be startingly original or overbearing.
Though Judge Bok is scrupulously fair in laying out the differing attitudes on the problems he discusses, it is possible to discern that his sympathy lies with those who view rehabilitation
of the criminal as the prime object of our penal law, though he
realistically recognizes that "[P] enologists shake their heads over
about twenty-five per cent of the prison population, those who
seem incorrigible by any current methods and who must be
safely secured in places like Alcatraz." 9 He writes approvingly:
The public is beginning to see and to accept the notion that how-

ever vengeful the victim of a crime may feel, it is not the
proper purpose of society to treat the malefactor vengefully but
rather to remove his impulse to crime and
replace it with an impulse to live dutifully with his fellow men.1 0
Judge Bok is correct, in the reviewer's opinion, in seeing the
greatest hope for a change in public attitudes in the matter of
post-trial treatment of the offender. Changes in trial procedure
are, unfortunately, too much to look for in our generation. Reactions to the recent Chicago experiment with the jury system appear to be proof positive that public opinion will permit no
tampering with traditional procedures at the trial level. And despite its reverence for the psychiatrist in the consulting room,
the public has an unholy suspicion of the same psychiatrist in
the courtroom. But public opinion has advanced to a point where
it is able to agree that varied treatment and facilities are beneficial to juvenile criminals and to adult alcoholics and narcotic
drug addicts. It will probably continue its advances in the penology area rather than in trial procedure, however much the latter, with its adversary and other deleterious aspects, pay strongly influence the prisoner's post-trial attitudes. At any rate, the
greatest strides in the criminal law in England in recent years have
been made in penology, and American ideas and practices have,
in the past, followed fairly closely behind the English. Thus we
can hope for a continuation of progress in the extension of integrated systems of institutions, classification of criminals and
individualization of treatment.
Nevertheless, the factors tending to hinder that advance cannot be minimized. Money for separate and segregated institu9 Id. at 64.
10 Id. at 73.
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tions and professionally trained personnel will be hard to obtain
in poorer states; a system of federal aid seems to be the only
possible solution there. Moreover, the prejudice against professionally trained social workers present in some administrators
of penal institutions will dissipate only with the passage of time.
Impartial and reasoned analyses of the problems involved,
similar to Judge Bok's, should aid the advance immeasurably.
One wishes that this book would be read not only by all lawyers
but by workers in allied fields who need additional proof that
lawyers are vitally concerned with proper solutions to these
problems and are not merely seeking to preserve a status quo
favoring their own interests in criminal litigation.
One also wishes that Judge Bok had explored other topics
such as wiretapping and newspaper reporting of criminal trials,
though these matters lie on the periphery of his subject, feeling
that his measured comments would have proven valuable. What
he has said, however, is thoughtful, wise, and worthy of close
reading.
ConradL. Kellenberg*
REGULATING BusiNEss By INDEPENDENT COMMIssIoN. By Marver H. Bernstein.' Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955.
Pp. xi, 306. $5.00. In the introduction the author states that "the
objective of the present study is threefold: (1) to evaluate critially the role of the independent regulatory commissions, (2) to
develop a more realistic concept of the process of governmental
regulation, and (3) to appraise the independent commission' as an
agent of governmental regulation at the national level."2 His
study encompasses seven independent federal regulatory commissions, namely, Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Power Commission, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Trade Commission, National Labor
Relations Board, and Securities and Exchange Commission. 3 Pro-

Assistant Professor, Notre Dame Law School.
Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
2 Text, Introduction at 7.
3 Two of these agencies, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Civil Aeronautics Board, regulate transportation carriers. The Federal
Power Commission regulates electricity and gas in interstate commerce. The
Federal Communications Commission regulates the telephone, telegraph,
radio and television broadcasting industries. The rest regulate practices in
special fields, such as the Federal Trade Commission, which seeks to prevent monopolistic and unfair trade practices, etc.; the National Labor
Relations Board, which is concerned with labor practices and collective
bargaining; and the Securities and Exchange Commission, which regulates
the issuance of securities, securities exchanges, and public utility holding
companies.
*
1
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fessor Bernstein's conclusion is that the-independent regulatory
commission is unsuited to regulate economic affairs..
The independent regulatory commission has been and is commonly regarded as a satisfactory instrument of governmental
control of business. This does not mean that it is considered an
"ideal" means for securing regulation of our economy. But, this
reviewer does not subscribe to the thesis espoused by Professor
Bernstein, that the independent regulatory commissions are not
effective instruments of economic control in those areas where
Congress has seen fit to delegate regulatory control to such agencies.
Professor Bernstein observes that: "One of the reputed advantages of the independent commission is its facility for recruiting a staff of experts to handle the day-to-day tasks of administrative regulation."' On the very next page he asks: "Does the
expertness of a commission help it make policy where a high degree of discretion is involved? Does it enable the commission to
formulate a comprehensive concept of the public welfare, plan
regulatory programs, and carry out judicial duties?" 5 The expertness of the staffs of independent regulatory commissions is of a
very high calibre. These experts are not specially trained robotlike persons who seek to apply their skills " . . . in some uniform

and impersonal fashion to matters which require variable treatment." Of course, they give due weight to precedent and settled
procedure, but they are also very much aware of the changing
nature of the administrative process. Thus, the commissioners,
the heads of an independent agency, have an available source of
sound advice. A commission, that is, the members of the commission, place great reliance on the recommendations of their experts
as a basis for formulating policy in the public interest. In fact,
contrary to Professor Bernstein's view, it is not a rare occurrence
for commissioners to possess " . . . the aptitude for gauging the

public mind and for integrating the points of view and proposals
of the experts into a policy in the public interest."7
Professor Bernstein is much concerned with the conflicting demands of private interests on the regulatory commissions. s He
notes that such demands " ... do not necessarily reduce a regulatory agency to the status of a lackey of those interests. Each agency has some potential or real capacity for developing a creative
role and rising above mere acceptance of the demands of domi4

Text at 113.

5 Id. at 114.

6 Id. at 124.
7

Id. at 125.

1 Id. at 264-265.
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nant interest groups." 9 As a matter of fact, a number of independent regulatory commissions have been accused of completely refusing to accept the point of view of regulated groups, rather than
being influenced by them.' 0
The author recognizes that: "The judiciary is regarded as a bulwark against faulty administrative discretion and arbitrary or unfair administrative decisions.""' He then discusses the efforts in
the 1 93 0 's to widen the scope of judicial review of administrative
action by those who distrusted the regulatory agencies. 1 2 But, in
commenting on the efforts to widen court review he observes that
the Supreme Court of the United States had ". . . developed more
respect for the views of administrative experts and was less inclined to substitute its judgment for that of the regulatory agency
in complicated matters of factual or legal interpretation."', 3 In
short, judicial review, according to Professor Bernstein, ". . . no
longer seemed to promise adequate relief from 'liberal' decisions
of regulatory agencies."' 14 That the subjects regulated by the independent regulatory agencies still greatly depend on the courts
as the tribunals in which to obtain redress for alleged erroneous
or arbitrary administrative action is attested by the fact that the
court dockets of several federal circuit courts of appeals, in particular, are crowded with cases involving orders of administrative
regulatory bodies. These courts and the Supreme Court have not
hesitated to decide against an administrative agency.15
In stating that the "theory of the commission [independent regulatory commission] assumes that the public interest can be discovered best in an office detached from the executive branch," 116
Professor Bernstein points up the whole purport of his book. To
him the control of economic affairs is a highly political process, and
is not a matter for a regulatory commission which is independent
of and separate from the executive departments under the President. But, such a separation does not mean that an independent
agency is divorced from the realities of the political process, or
9 Id. at 265.
At pages three and four of the introduction, Professor Bernstein notes:
"Commissions, it is charged, are influenced excessively by the groups subject
to regulation and are too easily molded into instruments to protect private
interests.'
"
Text at 96.
12 Id. at 96-97.
'Id. at 97.
"4 Ibid.
15 See, for example: United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp.,
350 U.S. 332 (1956); Federal Power Comm'n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 35G
U.S. 348 (1956).
16 Text at 157.
10
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from the strength and support the President can provide to an
agency. As Professor Bernstein indicates, "the president designates the chairmen of all independent commissions except the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Administrative responsibility
is vested
by law in the chairmen of the SEC, FPC, CAB, and
FTC."17
Professor Bernstein has writen a controversial book. One may
not agree with his ideas, but he presents his criticisms fairly and
provides the pro and con arguments involved in his study of regulation by independent commission. No regulatory agency (or for
that matter any governmental body) can afford to be complacent,
and any challenge to its effectiveness as an instrument of control
should be carefully studied. The purpose of creating administrative-regulatory agencies was to cope with the inadequacies of
the courts and legislatures to deal with the many everyday complex problems involved in the regulation of modern business.' 8
These agencies have served their purpose well. Of course, there
is room for improvement. Professor Bernstein does not state what
can be done to improve the regulatory process or what device
can be used to replace regulation by independent commissions.
But, he points to what, in his opinion and based on the opinion of
other scholars, is wrong with the present system of regulation
by such commissions. Perhaps some of his views may form the
basis for the self-improvement which should be the goal of every
regulatory body.
Louis C. Kaplan*

THE RoAD To JusTicE.. By Sir Alfred Denning.Y London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1955. Pp. viii, 118. $1.90. Lord Justice Denning
here collects addresses given by him during the last two years
in Canada, South Africa and the United States. The collection
is unified by a purpose ". . to indicate the principles which must
be observed in any country if justice is to be done therein," and
to show . . .what is the right way to arrive at justice." 2
17 Text at 9.
I8 See LANWis, THE ADM3NISTRATIVE PROCESS C.I (1938).

* Trial Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Power Commission. Member of the District of Columbia Bar and of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States.
1 Lord Justice, Her Majesty's Court of Appeal, England.
2 Text, introduction at vii.
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Directed to "those about to enter the profession,"13 the addresses
restate the basic principles of "fair trial" upon which indeed,
those "already in the profession" have grave cause to reflect in
our day.
Generations of lawyers and judges have been reared in the
jurisprudence of John Austin. Narrowly and rigidly analytical,
the Austinian approach undoubtedly contributed to exact definition of fundamental legal conceptions. Unfortunately it also
rang down its own "iron curtain" between "law" and "morality."
Its disciples at the bar or on the bench could thus rationalize
injustice done according to law by pleading that: "It cannot be
helped. The law will have it so," or, "We are only concerned with
what the law is, not with what it ought to be."'4 Against this Lord
Justice Denning now protests that "the legal profession, by its
exponents in days past or in days present, must account for every
injustice done in the name of the law,"5 He attacks the "facile
assumption" that "law is an end in itself."6 The alternative-a
remarriage between law and morality-furnishes the foundation upon which the duties of judges and lawyers in the administration of justice are restated.
Lord Justice Denning therefore faces the inevitable question
"What is Justice?" He says that "the nearest we can get to defining justice is to say that it is what the right-minded members
of the community-those who have the right spirit within thembelieve to be fair."'7 Of course, this answer is not completely satisfactory. It does not indicate the journey's end, but at least it puts
us on the road. We still ask: Who are the "right-minded members
of the community"? Who identifies them? Whence come their
criteria of "fariness"? There are among us those who believe that
there are "slums of the mind" and would therefore require previous
licensing of motion pictures designed for public commercial
exhibition. Are these the "right-minded"? There are those who
advocate artificial prevention of human birth. Do they or their
opponents have "the right spirit within them"? Is the matter to
be resolved by the sacred democratic process of counting heads
(votes) ? One recalls that the late Mr. Justice Holmes had no
other criterion of the goodness or badness of laws than "what
the crowd wants." Lord Justice Denning twice mentions "natural
justice" and says that "people will respect rules of law which are
3 Id. at viii.
4 Text at 1.
5 Id. at 1-2.
6 Id. at 2.
'
Id. at 4.
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intrinsically right and just and will 'expect their neighbors to
obey ....,"s No definition of "natural justice" is attempted. We
are not told what makes a law intrinsically right and just. If the
road to justice is the road back from Austinianism the way is
long, slow and painful.
We are nevertheless on that road. Lord Justice Denning with
the grace and charm we have come to expect in the occasional
addresses of English judges, proceeds to discuss the minimum
essentials we have worked out to safeguard "justice" pending
a definition of it that all will accept. "Just" judges, "honest" lawyers, a "free press," and above all these an "eternal vigilance" protecting what we have thus far won, are the indispensables. "Just"
judges are judges independent of outside pressures, not the product of "court packing," men who are personally beyond reproach,
who hear "both sides impartially" and who give clear and convincing reasons for their decisions. These sometimes forgotten
fundamentals are restated in a moral context. The story of the
struggle to establish them is briefly told. One could wish that
Lord Justice Denning had space in his slender volume to discuss the relations between the demands of "justice" as he defines
it and the demand for "certainty" in the law. What is the function of "stare decisis"? Is adherence to precedent demanded by
"justice" when men have settled their affairs in honest reliance
upon cases of long standing? When and how does a "higher"
justice require frustration of that reliance? The questions are
met as we travel the new "road to justice" here marked out.
Lord Justice Denning candidly discusses the three basic
charges against lawyers-abuse of privilege, distortion of truth
and excessive costs. The historic instances given but confirm the
conviction that canons of legal ethics, however detailed, are only
the "outer fortress" against these abuses. The "inner fortress"
must always be the advocate's own conscience. "The more one
thinks about the administration of justice, the more one realizes
thai it depends on the quality of the men who are ready to undertake it."9 Ours is still an adversary system. Nothing in Lord
Justice Denning's book suggests its abandonment. In the battle
between skilled advocates, each championing his client's cause,
we have thought that truth can best be discovered, taking men
as they are. The importance of courage in the advocate, best
illustrated perhaps in the forensic career of Lord Erskine in
times not less troubled than our own, is cited .by the author.
Where then is the line to be drawn between the duty of the ad8

9

Id. at 3.
Text, introduction at viii.
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vocate fighting with fortitude for his client in an adversary system like ours and the duty he owes to "justice" and to courts
which administer it? Certain general principles of guidance can
be given, but in a rapidly changing legal system the question
arises again and again in new forms. It is interesting to note in
this connection Lord Justice Denning's discussion of the ethical
problem presented by the current extension of legal aid to the
indigent by statute in England. Will cases which heretofore
certainly would be settled after a nice calculation of the chances
of recovery, balanced against the amount of costs, flow in increasing numbers into the courts now that costs and fees are to be
paid by the state?
We all face the resolution of the conflict between the demands
of the "free press" and the demands of an orderly and "fair"
trial in the courtroom. How far should the press be "free" to
report the incidents of a trial now in progress? How far should
the court's power to limit such reporting be extended in the interest of fairness to the accused? The English rules are discussed
by Lord Justice Denning. They go farther than our own in limiting the press. Are they desirable in this country? Those confronted with the problem will find the Lord Justice's discussion
most valuable.
Likewise pertinent to the problems of the American lawyer
and judge is the discussion of the law of "obscenity." Says Lord
Justice Denning:
The truth is that a book should not be condemned simply because
it may fall into hands that are not fit to hold it. It should be judged
according to the intention of the publisher. For whom did he cater?
If he seeks to appeal to young people or to other susceptible or irresponsible folk with lewd or filthy matter which may tend to deprave or corrupt them, then he is guilty of an offence and the book
should be destroyed: but if he is only catering for mature minds
which may be presumed strong enough to recognize evil and to
withstand it, then he can publish it, running his risk as to whether
any of them will think it worthwhile to read it. He should of course
not be allowed to escape with a facile excuse "I only meant it for
mature people." If he should take a classical or scientific work and
pick out lurid passages and publish them in a cheap edition dressed
up in painted covers suggestive of vice, he should be guilty of an
offence, although the entire work properly presented would be unobjectionable.' 0

Like any other test the difficulty is in its application. We shall
face once again the question whether the matter is "one of law"
or "one of fact." In either case the findings must represent what
the "right-minded members of the community," what those "who
10

Id. at 84.
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have the right spirit within them" believe. We are remitted to

the questions with which we began.
We can only mention a few of the other topics discussed, e.g.,
the introduction of the doctrine of "comparative negligence," the
problem of "horror comics," the reconciliation of "freedom of
religion" with the Church's demand that marriages with those outside the fold be accompanied by a promise that the children shall
be reared in the Church's creed. There is a brief discussion of the
conflict between the "closed shop" and the "right to work," a
problem waiting resolution among us. Lord Justice Denning
quotes the strong statement of Mr. Charles Geddes, Chairman of
the Trade Union Congress, criticizing the closed shop principle:
I do not believe the trade union movement of Great Britain can
live for very much longer on the basis of compulsion. Must people
belong to us or starve, whether they like our policies or not? Is that
to be the future of the movement? No, I believe the trade union
card is an honour to be conferred, not a badge which signifies that
you have got to do something whether you like it or not We want
the right to exclude people from our union if necessary and we
cannot do that on a basis of "Belong or starve."1 1
The Road to Justice is a significant book. The repudiation of
Austinianism, coming from one so highly placed, must lead to a
new evaluation of the law in the light of its moral attributes and
purposes.

Edward F. Barrett*

11 Id. at 103, quoted in London Times, May 21, 1955.
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
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